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Abstract: The paper presents a political agency model that observes how budgetary decisions 
on public good production affect the prospects of holding office for an incumbent political 
party. A simple budgetary function is broadened to include other expenditures such as public 
sector wages and social transfers so as to present a constraint to rent-extraction. Upon this a 
ratio of public goods to other expenditures is determined, which the party must keep within 
certain boundaries set by the voters. Rents are extracted from public good expenditures 
instead of being exogenously given as a part of a budget, as the party must be able to conceal 
rent-extraction due to constitutional boundaries. The incumbent’s decision on rents and public 
good production directly affects the state of the economy upon which the voters decide 
whether to re-elect the incumbent or not. Incumbents make their decisions based on observing 
the economic growth shock. For high levels of growth they decide to respect the voter re-
election rule, while for low levels they will defect and extract maximum rents. In a repeated 
game setting an incumbent will always chose the optimal strategy with respect to the observed 
growth shock. This way, for high enough levels of economic growth an incumbent party may 
stay in office for an infinite amount of periods and keep maximizing rents with respect to the 
given constraints, without having to trade-off rents for holding office. The paper presents 
empirical evidence on United States gubernatorial and state legislature elections from 1992 to 
2008 to evaluate the underlining theory.  
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1. ITRODUCTIO 
Models of political agency are based on the principal-agent relationship between the 
voters who act as principals and the politicians who act as agents. The main focus of the 
models is the inability of principals to completely control what agents do. Political agency 
literature tries to understand how politicians misuse their political power in order to obtain an 
excess amount of budgetary funds defined as political rents gained from pursuing office. A 
rational agent’s maximization problem is to acquire political rents outside the market in the 
political arena where he controls budgetary expenditures. Here arises the conflict of interests 
implied by the principal-agent framework. The principals are unable to observe everything an 
agent does creating the problem of electoral accountability of politicians. Uncertainty and 
asymmetric information give further incentives to politicians to misrepresent themselves and 
pursue their own interests. Due to such behaviour of agents there will exist a trade-off 
between voter utility (policies appealing to voters) and rent-extraction.  
Political agents have an incentive to limit rent-extraction since they are accountable to 
voters through the electoral process. The voters vote retrospectively where they punish bad 
behaviour of incumbents. Too much rent-extraction may reduce economic performance and 
send signals of an incompetent incumbent. According to the findings in Murphy et al. (1993) 
rents can also hurt innovation and therefore reduce economic growth resulting in bad 
equilibria and lower future outputs. Limiting rent-extraction is rewarded by voters through re-
election. Voters assign a cut-off threshold value above which they re-elect the politician. 
Since the political agent is a rational utility maximizer he chooses to respect the voter 
threshold in order to stay in office and maximize future payoffs from rents. Re-election 
incentives will therefore improve the selection and discipline of politicians.  
The models are often characterized by a two period setting in which a politician’s term 
ends in the second period. In order to stay in office to reach the second period the incumbent 
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politician should limit his rent-extraction. This creates the moral hazard problem since the bad 
politician is free to divert the entire budget towards his private means in the second and final 
period. There is also an adverse selection problem concerning how good politicians should 
distinguish themselves from bad ones, since the first period behaviour of bad politicians 
implies mimicking the behaviour of good politicians in order to remain in office and 
maximize next period rents.  
The paper aims to show how in Western type democracies political parties can 
maximize their time in office and still obtain enough rents to satisfy the private utilities of its 
party members. It will present a model that alters certain typical assumptions of other political 
agency models in order to test its effect in a more realistic scenario of politics. This includes 
setting an infinitely repeated game with political parties instead of individual candidates in 
order to remove the last period (term limit) effect. This will shift the focus to the dynamics of 
party decision making and emphasise its aims of maintaining a positive reputation and still 
achieving its rent-seeking goals. Every political party has the desire to indefinitely continue 
with its rent extraction, even if this ‘only’ implies maintaining a certain level of power within 
a society, to which each party member may reap personal gains. If the incumbent party is a 
rational rent maximizer it plays a cooperative strategy with the voters in order to remain in 
office for a long period of time. The incumbent will take the economic environment into 
account when making budgetary allocation decisions and will play strategically according to 
the observed economic situation. After presenting the political agency literature the paper 
defines the political environment and the model’s main assumptions. It solves the model by 
specifying voter and politician strategies and the voter re-election rule upon which the 
equilibrium levels of public good production, rents and the state of the economy are 
determined. It uses the data on United States gubernatorial and state elections from 1992 to 
2008 to test the main predictions of the model.   
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2. RELATED  LITERATURE  
The most comprehensive review of political agency models and their implications is 
done by Besley (2006). He recognizes three main types of political agency models. Early 
models developed by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) observed the moral hazard problem 
of the agents. They brought to focus the problems of uncertainty, retrospective voting and 
electoral control and introduced the threshold level of the voters’ decision rule that should 
restrain bad behaviour of an incumbent. Other models introduced the problem of adverse 
selection (Besley and Prat, 2006) where the main issue was to differ between the good or bad 
type of a politician. The focus is on how the voters can form beliefs on different types based 
on signals of politician’s behaviour. The strongest emphasis of the literature has been on the 
models combining both moral hazard and adverse selection such as in Austen-Smith and 
Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1993), Besley and Case (1995a), Coate and Morris 
(1995),  Rogoff (1990), Persson  and Tabellini (2000) and Besley and Smart (2007). These 
models use policies chosen by incumbents as a signalling message to the voters, upon which 
they will base their conclusion on the incumbent’s type. They are solved through a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium where both pooling and a separating equilibrium exist and bad 
politicians are able to mimic the good ones in their policy choices in order to send signals of a 
good type to voters to get re-elected.  
After the initial focus of the political agency literature on theoretical models, lately 
there has been a growing influence of empirical papers in the field. They were mostly 
concerned with observing gubernatorial elections and the effects of term limits on governor 
rent-extracting behaviour (Besley and Case 1995a, 1995b; Alt, De Mesquita and Rose 2011), 
corruptive activities (Ferraz and Finan, 2011) or on environmental policy (List and Sturm, 
2006). Besley and Case (2003) test the political agency framework on the effect of political 
institutions on policy choices in the U.S.  
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Finally, Persson and Tabelini (2000), Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 
observe the career concern model and electoral cycles where economic performance becomes 
the signal voters receive. Incumbents need to show competence in maintaining economic 
stability and growth, which is compromised by extensive rent-seeking (as found by Murphy et 
al 1993), so a limit of rent-seeking will show competence and ensure re-election. A good 
empirical testing of this kind of setting can be found in Brender and Drazen (2008). The 
career concern model creates a link to the models of the political business cycle pioneered by 
Nordhaus (1975), developed further by many others, but most comprehensively presented in 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997).  
3. POLITICAL EVIROMET  
This paper aims to challenge the assumptions of most political agency models in 
several ways. The first standpoint is that all politicians are rent-seekers meaning that the 
voters don’t face the problems of adverse selection but only the moral hazard problem where 
politicians need to be constrained in their abuse of power. Politicians seek to maximize their 
private interest from holding office by implementing their preferred policies. These are 
sometimes white elephant projects or pork-barrel spending, but the pursuit for satisfying their 
own private interests might even generate favourable public outcomes. The idea that all 
politicians are rent-seekers follows the models presented in Besley (2004) and Casselli and 
Morrelli (2004) where selection of politicians is adverse and always produces bad politicians. 
The assumption is that opportunity costs of working in a market sector are too high for high-
ability individuals so there will always be negative selection of candidates into politics. Even 
if high-ability citizens were allowed to enter office in order capitalize on their political 
experience such as predicted by Matozzi and Merlo (2008) or in Gagliarducci et al. (2010) 
there are still incentives for these individuals to enter the political market in order to obtain 
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personal benefits for themselves, meaning they will still engage into a trade-off with the 
voters over the optimal policies.  
The second standpoint is that the paper observes political parties rather than individual 
politicians. This assumption goes in line with the work of Levy (2004) where political parties 
rather than individuals are better in setting policies and appealing to voters in a 
multidimensional policy space. In a single dimension policy space the findings of the citizen-
candidate framework (Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) fit the policy 
setting much better as whichever individual running is closest to the median voter will win the 
elections. In situations with more than one policy issue Levy (2004) finds that parties are the 
best way of aggregating preferences of politicians and sending their signals to voters. This 
setting is more realistic since all budgetary decisions are made on a local level where state and 
local authorities assign public projects and distribute federal spending. The governor isn’t the 
only one making the allocation decisions; they are made within-party lines since the benefits 
from being in-office are shared with other members of the executive branch and party 
legislators. After the governor’s term limit expires the party looks to remain in-office with a 
new candidate.  
When using political parties instead of candidates the paper moves beyond the two 
period setting, modelling an infinitely repeated game such as in Ferejohn (1986) and Banks 
and Sundaram (1993) in order to avoid the last period effect. An infinitely repeated game 
implies introduction of reputation and constant interaction between politicians and voters, as 
applied by Alesina (1988). The paper’s assumption is that the incumbent wishes to maximize 
his time in office since a political party isn’t constrained by any constitutional boundary of 
how long it can stay in office.
1
 It can hold office persistently while only changing its 
                                                 
1
 There indeed exist parties which are able to remain in office for up to 20 or even 30 years. This would mean 
that they consecutively win 5 to 7 elections, instead of only 2 after which the model ends.  
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politicians. The paper has an intention to show that a party can use persistent power to acquire 
rents in every period while at the same time maximizing its chances of re-election. The 
assumption of a rent discount factor is rejected since the model introduces a stochastic growth 
shock to evaluate whether budgetary revenues and budgetary expenditures will be increasing 
or decreasing in future periods. This implies that, during times of economic growth (which 
occurs most of the time), public good production, a way through which rents can be extracted, 
as well as the total amount of public expenditures tends to increase over time implying more 
rents in every subsequent period instead of fewer rents.
2
   
Existence of parties eliminates the emphasis on term limits, an important factor of 
political agency literature (Besley and Case, 1995b, 2003; Smart and Sturm, 2006; Alt, de 
Mesquita and Rose, 2011; Ferraz and Finan, 2011). With term limits reputation is less 
important in the final term where expropriation of rents can commence. By introducing 
continuous agents on the political arena – parties – this widely accepted idea loses support. In 
modern democracies incumbent politicians do care about the reputation of their party, but also 
of their own. If politicians engage in other activities when they exit or retire from office or if 
they seek to run for higher office (such as assumed and modelled in Diermeier, Keane and 
Merlo, 2005) then the reputational capital they create for themselves is an important decision 
parameter.   
Political rents obtained from holding office are defined as any form of private benefits 
acquired from the political arena, as interpreted by Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974). The 
benefits generally include any monetary or non-monetary concessions acquired by politicians 
through restricting competition by unnecessary regulation, protecting or creating monopolies 
or any other form of satisfying various interest groups through prone legislation. This paper 
                                                 
2
 Intuition is that in each period as the economy grows, cities expand and the population rises there is an 
increasing need for government services, new roads, new demands for public transportation, new schools, 
hospitals, etc.  
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recognizes rents in a similar but somewhat different form. Rents take the form of excess 
payments extracted through public good expenditure and obtained exclusively by an 
incumbent, never by an opposition politician.
3
 The rent-extraction process is linked with 
corruption and misappropriation of budget funds for private benefits, similar to what is shown 
by Ferraz and Finan (2011). They recognize corruptive activities as a form of frauds in 
procurement, diversion of public funds (expenditures without proof of purchase) and over-
invoicing (buying goods above the market price).  
An assumption most political agency models hold is that rents are determined 
simultaneously with other budgetary expenditures and extracted directly out of the budget. 
Rent-extraction can be maximized by spending all budget revenues on rents instead of public 
goods (the Leviathan scenario set by Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).  This creates a trade-off 
between re-election and rent-extraction, as more budget funds allocated towards rents distorts 
the budget directly leaving less funds for other budgetary expenditures. Such an assumption is 
questionable due to the existence of certain constitutional and legal boundaries that ensure 
budget transparency and forbid budgetary misuse for personal benefit under the punishment 
of imprisonment. Therefore incumbent politicians need to think of a way to “hide” their rent-
extraction. The assumption of this paper is that rents can’t directly be extracted from tax 
revenues; rather they are dependent on public good provision, as more public goods increase 
rent extracting opportunities. Incumbent politicians maximize their public good expenditures 
but with respect to the budgetary redistribution obligation of satisfying the needs of voters 
besides public goods, namely social transfers and public sector wages. By adding transfers 
and wages only a fraction of expenditures gets diverted towards public good production (and 
                                                 
3
 The classical rent-seeking definition may give space for an opposition politician to obtain rents through the 
legislative process. If any opposition politician is a member of an important Parliament committee he or she may 
use this power to legislate laws that favour various interest groups that may finance their campaigns. In this 
paper, only an incumbent has the legitimate power to produce public goods (at a national or local level), since 
only a politician in office may distribute budget funds and through this process is eligible to acquire rents.  
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hence towards rent-extraction). The incumbent maximization function would concern 
maximizing public good expenditures (to increase internal rents) while holding them in the 
same constant ratio to transfers and other wage expenditures (to increase re-election chances).  
4. MODEL 
 The model is defined as an infinitely repeated game between the voters and incumbent 
political parties. In each period an incumbent political party has to make budgetary decisions 
on the allocation of social transfers (), public sector wages () and public good expenditures 
(). After making the decision on public good expenditures an incumbent will get a certain 
amount of rents  ∈ 0, 	
 diverted from each public good it creates. Rents are determined 
endogenously and can only be extracted from the public good expenditures function. They 
represent a payoff to all politicians in power, along with ego rents from holding office, R. 
Rents are drawn from a cumulative distribution function  and between the minimum 
required amount of public goods (denoted as ) which imply extracting zero rents ( = 0) and 
the maximum possible amount of public goods () for which the rents are  = 	: 
                                                          =                                                    1 
The incumbent party will base its budgetary allocation decisions as well as its rent 
extraction on observing a stochastic economic growth shock ~ −, 
. The  parameter 
will determine the future level of tax revenues and consequently a higher next period budget 
that signals higher expected rent-extraction in future periods. If  grows continuously over 
time an incumbent party will choose a strategy to maximize their probability of winning and 
remaining in office since it will be able to get higher rents every subsequent period. If the  
decreases the party will chose a rent maximization strategy in the current period since it 
expects less rents in the future. Due to the introduction of the  parameter there is no discount 
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factor in the model, as future rents will depend solely on the growth rate of the economy. The 
politicians observe  with certainty each period before they make their decision, while the 
voters observe  with a probability  ∈ 0,1
. 
An incumbent party faces a budget constraint in each period which is defined as: 
      = !",  + $ + %        (2) 
Where $ = & '()  are aggregate transfers to the public (social benefits, 
unemployment benefits, pensions etc.) while % = & '()  are aggregate public sector wage 
expenditures of the government.
4
 The term on the left is total revenue (tax rate times 
aggregate income). Taxation is proportional to the level of income. The first term on the right 
( = & '() ) are total public good expenditures which are equal to the actual costs of all 
goods (!") which are stochastic and distributed on !"~ 0, *
 and known only to the 
politicians, times the total quantity of all goods (G). The single public good () expenditure 
function (+ = 1) is defined as:   
    !",  = !+ = !" + +         (3) 
                                                      where   = ! − !" = 0          (4) 
The term ! represents the unit cost of a public good as presented to the public 
(through official sources and the media), while !" represents the actual cost of goods which 
are never observed by the public and known only to the politician. Since actual costs are a 
stochastic shock the politicians can’t anticipate the total rents they might get in future periods, 
but only whether these rents will be higher or lower (based on ).  are rents extracted from 
providing a single public good and present a difference between total costs and actual costs 
(unobserved to the voters). They can’t be set directly in the budget function (2) due to the 
                                                 
4
 The level of expenditures is always increasing if constant GDP growth is assumed and a constant wage growth 
is linked with real GDP growth (adjusted by inflationary expectations of the unions by collective bargaining). 
This doesn’t imply a constant increase of the expenditure to GDP ratio but a simple observation that public 
expenditures do indeed increase over time, unless disturbed by a negative growth shock.  
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assumption of budget transparency; rather, they must be concealed and extracted indirectly 
within the public good expenditure function. The way rents are defined in (4) implies that an 
incumbent party assigns a fixed weight (λ) from any public good it produces to rent-
extraction
5
. The relative size of rents will according to (3) and (4) depend on total quantity of 
public goods produced, and from (4) it can also be inferred that total rents depend on how 
much the public good actually costs;  = 1)21 !", for 0 ≤ 0 < )5 . Since λ is always kept fixed, 
an increase in rents can only be obtained by an increase in total funds diverted towards public 
good expenditures (). The levels of total costs and the quantities of public goods will add 
uncertainty in total rent-extraction. For higher total costs an incumbent gets more rents but 
less public goods, if a politician were to keep  in the same level as before.  Hence the total 
quantity of public goods will depend on the realization of the cost shock. However, 
maximization of rents is observed from the perspective of total public good expenditures as 
defined in (1).  
The constraint of the incumbent’s rent maximization is the ratio of public goods to 
other government expenditures which constitutes the voter re-election rule. From the budget 
constraint (2) the politicians and voters can determine the term 6 which denotes a ratio of 
budget expenditures diverted towards public goods against expenditures on social transfers 
and public sector wages:  
                                                              6 = !", $ + %                                                      5 
In order to get re-elected the incumbent needs to balance the ratio of public goods to 
other expenditures at a constant level depicting its promise of ensuring constant wage growth 
in the public sector as well as transfers to various social groups. The ratio will act as a 
                                                 
5
 Imagine a political party demanding a commission for any procurement it allows. This commission (a 
percentage of costs of a good that goes directly into the politicians’ pockets) stays the same in relative terms for 
any project, but increases in absolute terms as more government revenue is allocated to public good expenditure 
each period.  
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constraint to incumbents’ rent maximization since any decrease of public sector wages or 
transfers risks losing voter support. If the ratio was too high, this would imply, for example, 
less money for agricultural subsidies. This would yield strikes of the farmers creating a signal 
of a bad state of the economy for the incumbent leading to loss of voter support. If public 
sector wages would, for example, cease to grow at their predetermined level, this would result 
in discontent from public sector workers, again creating a distorted picture of the government 
to the median undecided voters leading to a lack of political support for the incumbent. This 
distorted signal of government performance defines the state of the economy. The state of the 
economy doesn’t necessary imply economic performance, but rather signals sent by 
dissatisfied voters, observed by ideologically unbiased voters. Therefore the satisfaction of the 
ratio will directly impact the state of the economy and incumbent chances of re-election.  
Timing 
  Timing starts by a observing a political party in power in their first term in office 
 = 0 which has to make a decision on allocating budgetary spending. All politicians are 
rational rent maximizers, meaning their goal is to maximize time in office.  
(1) Incumbent party observes 82) (previous period growth) and receives a signal of 
whether to expect high or low levels of rents in the current period. It will also observe 
the stochastic cost shock !, and the desired level of the voter re-election rule.  
(2) Upon observing the shocks with certainty, during its term in office the incumbent 
continuously chooses total levels of public good expenditures,  (within the set 
9 ∈ :;, … , '=) and consequently the ratio 6 taking into consideration the voter re-
election rule. Voters do not observe the policies set by the government directly. They 
cannot observe the final level of rents, nor the actual costs of public goods, but can 
observe the shock  with probability . 
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(3) After the first half of the term spent in office
6
 the incumbent party can observe the 
growth shock of the current period, 8 upon which it will anticipate expected future 
rents (from  = 1 onwards) and upon which it will base its final decision on public 
good expenditures and rent-extraction in  = 0. At this point the party forms 
expectations over the total amount of rents which it gathers throughout  = 0.  
(4) The final chosen level of  conditions a certain state of the economy, denoted by >, 
where > ∈ :>;;, … , >''=. The budget policy generates effects on certain voter 
groups (unemployed, pensioners, public sector workers). Any distortion of the ratio 
will result in dissatisfaction of particular groups who might find themselves as victims 
of a rent-extracting government policy disregarding their welfare.  
(5) Pre-election time. Voters observe the state of the economy (>) and make their decision 
on whether or not to support the incumbent. The incumbent party at the end of the 
period gathers all the rents they have extracted during their time in office which makes 
their rent-extraction complete for the current period. 
(6) Elections. A poor state of the economy infers an incumbent who extracted too much 
rents (and didn’t respect the re-election rule) and is thus elected out of office, while a 
good state of the economy infers an incumbent who pleased the voters just enough to 
remain in office.  
The entire process is repeated for all  ∈ :1, … , ∞=. Each period the incumbent faces 
the same decisions and pre-observes the same parameters before making these decisions. The 
voters also play strategies based on the levels of the re-election rule, which is updated every 
period according to their preferences.  
                                                 
6
 One can easily imagine a term of two or four years of length, where one strategy is applied in the first half of 
the term, while a different strategy is applied in the other part of the term. The theories of political business 
cycles described in Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) are based on similar assumptions. 8 is the growth shock 
one year before the elections (for a two year length of a term).  
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4.1. VOTER UTILITY AD THE RE-ELECTIO RULE 
Voters make decisions based on signals of political behaviour and actions of 
politicians. They evaluate whether a politician deserves to remain in office depending on how 
he distributes public spending and how this can shape the state of the economy and economic 
performance. Although they are free to observe policies the model implies that the voters act 
under the Downsian (1957) rational ignorance assumption and choose not to engage in direct 
observation of politician activities as this may prove to be too costly.  
There are three voter groups (or districts) in the economy; two partisan on each side 
supporting its respective ideologically differing parties, and the middle one being 
ideologically unbiased. Interest groups do exist but unlike the findings in Coate and Morris 
(1995) their influence on electoral results is marginalized since I assume they become biased 
towards either parties and thus join the partisan votes on either side. The intuition is that 
interest groups often bias themselves towards parties that are ready to offer them concessions 
and announce their support towards a certain option before the elections.  
All groups are assumed to be roughly equal by size and magnitude. In order to win the 
election the incumbent party doesn’t need to maximize total voter support but only the 
necessary amount to win the election. They need to obtain the support of 2 voter groups (or 
equivalently win in 2 districts). Assume that victory is certain in 1 out of 3 groups/districts 
both on the opposite corners of a one-dimensional ideological spectrum. The focus of the 
politicians is on the middle, undecided group, with the highest density and most swing voters 
(as in Persson and Tabellini, 2000). However, the group of undecided voters is hard to 
observe since members of the group come from different incomes and backgrounds. 
Satisfaction of the middle groups’ interests would be to keep a stable state of the economy. 
The median, undecided group is by assumption homogenous in its preferences over the re-
election threshold. This simplification is due to putting more emphasis on politician strategies 
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of maximizing time in-office. By simply stating the re-election threshold as the group’s 
median voter decision rule would yield the same intuitive result.  
The utility of median group @ consists of voters’ wages (determining their private 
sector income and disposable income or consumption), social transfers they receive 
(unemployment benefits, pensions, agricultural subsidies etc.), public sector wages 
(determined by social contracts made by the unions representing the public sector workers and 
the government; their annual increase is tied to GDP growth adjusted by inflation) and 
preferences of voters towards total public good provision. The utility function of group @ is:  
    AB = CB + D+           (6) 
where C is consumption, C = 1 −  + $. Insert this into (6) to get: 
   AB = 1 − B + $B + D+        (7) 
where the level of income B determines aggregate income from labour  (in both private and 
public sector) and $B denotes social transfers to group @. The final term denotes a smooth 
concave increasing function describing voters’ preferences over public good provision.  
Voters also draw utility from the state of the economy, > and the exogenous growth 
shock  which they observe with a certain probability  ∈ 0,1
. By observing  they form 
expectations on incumbent behaviour in the current period. The values of these two 
parameters will determine the re-election decision for group @. The final expected voter utility 
function for the decisive median group j is: 
   EAB = 1 − B + $B + D+ + >68 + 8       (8) 
The members of the median group are consistent of two types of voters: (i) those 
directly affected by government budgetary decisions (transfer recipients and public sector 
workers) and willing to show their dissatisfaction directly; and (ii) those indirectly affected 
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(private sector workers who determine public good preferences) who will punish the 
incumbent for either a deteriorating state of the economy or a decrease of public good 
production. The group homogeneity assumption still stands since it only concerns the levels 
of the re-election ratio threshold.  
Re-election rule 
The voter re-election rule acts as the constraint to politician rent maximization and a 
method of ensuring political accountability. The voters’ threats are credible as if they observe 
negative signals from the incumbent party they elect it out of office. From equation (5) the 
voter re-election rule is defined as the ratio of public goods to other expenditures 6 = FGH, 
6 ∈ 0,1
. Assuming that the denominator is fixed the incumbent party can’t change the 
levels of wages and social transfers; it can only choose a level of public goods
7
. Therefore the 
decision on public good expenditures will determine the value of the ratio.  
Voters assign the ratio 6 to be between certain levels. Not too low as this means not 
enough goods are being produced and not too high as they would like more public resources 
to be diverted towards redistribution programs and public sector wages. So the level of 6 is 
determined within a set I ∈ J6 , 6K8. A high ratio implies high levels of public goods: 
6 = FGH, and similarly a low ratio implies low levels of public goods: 6 = FGH. Any level of 
public good expenditures within these boundaries would satisfy the voters’ desire for a good 
state of the economy, > ∈ L>, >M. The decision of the incumbent based on the voter re-election 
rule lies on the line between the two levels of the ratio the public is indifferent of and is 
graphically represented in Figure 1:  
                                                 
7
 Wages and social transfers can be observed as constantly increasing in line with the real GDP increase and 
before each budgetary decision their desired level is known. This is why they are considered to be fixed.   
8
 The level of 6 is determined by the total amount of transfers and public sector wages the public needs. Then by 
knowing this level of desired total transfers and wages, a politician can easily calculate what is left from the total 
budget revenue to spend on public goods. 
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For any 6 between J6 , 6K the state of the economy will be within > ∈ L>, >M meaning 
that the decision of the voters is to re-elect the incumbent. For 6 the state of the economy (>) 
although lower than optimal, is still high enough for the voters to vote for the incumbent. For 
any 6 > 6 too much public goods are produced and not enough money is left for transfers 
and wages so the state of the economy will be > < > which is lower than the lowest level still 
appreciated by the voters. For any 6 < 6, the state of the economy will be > > > but still not 
good enough to satisfy the majority of voter preferences since not enough public goods are 
built which may trigger dissatisfaction with those voters within group @ with stronger public 
good preferences. The ratio, similar to public good preferences, can be described by an 
increasing concave function as for higher values of the ratio, voter utility increases at a 
decreasing rate, up to a certain point after which it falls for further increases of the ratio. This 
goes in line with the model’s assumptions since too much public goods imply less transfers 
and public sector wages.  
According to the assumptions of the re-election rule the probability of winning of the 
incumbent can be determined as: 
                                               OP = Q 1,              R  6 ≤ 6 ≤ 60,   R   6 < 6  or 6 > 6 T                                   9 
6 6  
> ∈ L>, >M 
Re-election 
> > > > > > 
 = , $ + % = 0 
All public expenditures go 
towards public goods 
 
 = $ + %,  = 0 
All public expenditures go 
towards transfers or wages 
 
No re-election No re-election 
Figure 1: Voter re-election rule 
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The incumbent party wins with certainty for setting the ratio within the re-election set 
I ∈ J6 , 6K, and loses with certainty for any value outside of the set I.   
4.2. ICUMBET UTILITY AD STRATEGY  
The incumbent party is a rational utility maximizer seeking to win elections in every 
period to have an option of extracting rents. The incumbent party’s utility is a combination of 
ego rents from holding office and rents that can be extracted once in office. Since the position 
of holding office is primary attractive because of the possible rent-extracting opportunities, 
the optimal strategy of the incumbent party is to keep this position as long as they are able to 
maximize the flow of rents in the current period and expected rents in future periods. In  = 0 
this utility is achieved with certainty (since it is already in office), while in every subsequent 
period it depends on the probability of winning office. The total level of expected rents in 
every period is dependent on the growth shock :   
                                     VP; = W; + 82)  ;  …   = 0                           10 
                        EVP) = XW) + 82)  ) Y OP682) …    = 1               11 
                                                           ⋯ 
                      EVP' = XW' + 82)  ' Y OP682) …    = [              12 
In every period  = 1, … , ∞ the incumbent decides on a new level of public good 
production (and hence rent-extraction).  
An incumbent’s ex ante utility (expected utility at the start of term  = 0) is: 
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     EVP = EVP;
 + OP688 ] EVP8

'
8()
+ ^1 − OP68_EVP` 
         13 
The first term denotes expected utility in the actual period  = 0 as defined in (10); the 
utility it will receive at the end of the first term in office, when total rents are realized. The 
second term is the sum of all future expected utilities when in office
9
, from period  = 1 
onwards, if it wins the election with probability OP68 depended on satisfying the ratio in 
period  = 0. The incumbent’s future rents will depend on 8 in the current period  = 0 as it 
will signal how big expected rents might be in period  = 1. The final term denotes the 
probability of losing the election if the party doesn’t respect the re-election ratio and the 
utility it will get if the challenger, the opposition party, is now in office. This utility for the 
incumbent might even be negative once the opposition party is in office, as too much rent-
extraction may be subject for punishment (such as a corruption trial).  
The incumbent plays the same Prisoner’s Dilemma game each period in an infinitely 
repeated game setting. When one party loses an election, a new party is in power facing the 
same decision and basing its rent-extracting decision on the same strategy. The incumbent’s 
equilibrium strategy is to adapt the expectations of the voters to play the cooperative strategy 
every period, where a cooperative strategy implies respecting the voter re-election rule every 
single period in order to remain in office. Any defection from this optimal strategy will result 
in loss of elections (immediate punishment) and the inability to extract further rents. The 
game can be thought of as a tit-for-tat Prisoner’s Dilemma game where any deviation from a 
cooperative strategy is met with immediate punishment from the voters. Even though the 
agent does change after the voters imply a punishment strategy, from the voters’ perspective 
they always play a tit-for-tat game where they punish defection and reward cooperation.  
                                                 
9
 For simplicity ego rents are normalized to zero in all future periods.  
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A repeated game setting compares the defection and cooperation strategies of the 
incumbent party starting from its first term in office,  = 0. The incumbent plays a 
cooperative strategy if and only if the expected utility from the cooperative strategy is higher 
than the expected utility from the defection strategy: 
        EVP;
 + 8 ] OP682)EVP8

'
8()
≥  EVP;	
 + EVP` 
             14 
The term on the right of the equation presents expected utility from taking maximum 
rents and the utility the party gets from a challenger in power, achieved with certainty for a 
defective strategy. When it defects it does so to maximize rent-extraction but is faced with no 
further future payoffs in terms of rents. Utility in  = 0 will either be cooperative (with ) 
or defective (with 	), and will depend on the level of 82) observed in the previous 
period, before holding office (as in equation (10)). However, the incumbent’s decision is 
based on anticipating what future rents will be. It observes ; in the current period (one year 
before the elections in a two year term), and bases its decision on current period rent-
extraction on anticipated future rents. Under the assumption of constant growth where future 
allocation of rents is always higher, there is no period in which an incumbent is a ‘lame duck’. 
It chooses to defect only when the  parameter is sufficiently small so that it might find itself 
in a better position now with maximum rents then with future lower rents.  
Proposition 1: Incumbent party will base its strategy on rent-extraction and consequently on 
its chances of re-election based on the value of the current period growth shock 8. For any  
                           8 ≥ EVP;	
 + EVP` 
 − EVP;
& OP682)EVP8
 '8() = ∗                        15 
the incumbent party always plays a cooperative strategy and chooses its level of rent-
extraction and public good creation with respect to the voter re-election rule, while for any  
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                              8 < EVP;	
 + EVP` 
 − EVP;
& OP682)EVP8
 '8() = ∗                       16 
the incumbent party will always defect and by extracting too much rents be voted out 
of office. These set of strategies solved for 8 are a unique sub-game perfect $ash equilibrium 
strategy of the incumbent party’s repeated game.  
Proof: See Appendix A.  
The intuition is as follows. In bad times during a negative shock  ^ < ∗, > < >_ if 
the incumbent party wants to stay in office it needs to limit its rent-extraction even further to 
make sure that the state of the economy remains good > > > in order to get re-elected. If it 
fails to adjust its ‘greed’ towards this shock it will lose the elections. Most of the politicians 
get voted out of office in recession periods. The model implies this is because the politicians 
are reluctant to reduce their own rents. The incumbent party in this case decides it will be too 
costly for them (in the sense of less rent-extraction) to maintain the current level of the ratio. 
They will extract maximum rents now as they anticipate lesser future rents. This can be 
thought of as reaching a term limit in the standard political agency framework when the 
incumbents extract maximum rents in this period knowing they will be released from office in 
the next one. When the incumbent observes  ≥ ∗ they will behave and perform in a 
cooperative fashion and opt to stay in power, knowing they will be able to extract more rents.  
The growth shock  acts as a decisive factor for an incumbent on whether or not to 
play a cooperative strategy. It observes 82) from before holding office and receives a signal 
of what costs (!") to expect in period  = 0. After observing both of these stochastic 
components (82) and !") the party can anticipate the level of rents in the current period but 
cannot anticipate their level in future periods. Upon observing 8 in the middle of the current 
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period
10
 it will make its final decision on whether or not to respect the re-election rule. The 
paper finds empirical evidence on this assumption by linking economic growth from one year 
before the elections to the levels of the ratio in the election year. The beliefs on the shock  
are updated every period upon which the party forms expectations of rents in future periods. 
They will calculate all future rents based on the value of 8 observed in the actual period. As 
the 8 changes in each subsequent period they update beliefs on their expected utility and 
decide whether to cooperate or not.  
4.3. EQUILIBRIUM 
The incumbent party’s budgetary decision and the probability of winning office for the 
next term depend directly on the voter re-election rule, which it will respect only for a high 
enough . The incumbent’s allocation choices in each period can be summarized in Figure 2: 
 
                                                 
10
 Keep in mind that t here denotes election period, which is two calendar years.  
A A 
 
 
 
6  
 
6 
6 
> 
 = ∗ 
6 = 6∗ 
 > 
Re-election 
> 
6 
 = ∗ 
6 = 6∗ 
 = 0 
Figure 2: Relationship between public good production, rent-extraction and re-election 
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The first graph on the lower left depicts the quasi-linear relationship between rents and 
public good production. Rents increase with public good expenditures only after a certain 
initial allocation. The intuition is that each state needs a crucial initial level of public goods to 
be produced and it isn’t plausible to extract rents below that point. After that certain point (at 
the lower desired level of public goods, ) rent-extraction begins. For a level of public good 
expenditures less than or equal to  rents are zero. Any increase of public good expenditures 
above  substantially increases rents relative to their previous levels. Voter welfare will be 
increasing at a decreasing rate due to the concavity of their utility function. The intuition is 
that sometimes politicians produce certain public goods that aren’t of crucial importance for 
the voters (such as organization of sporting events and building stadiums) but it nonetheless 
increases their welfare. As soon as the voters observe a negative utility triggered by higher 
politician rent-extraction they will feel that the politicians aren’t doing a good job which 
increases their dissatisfaction. This can be observed for any point of rents higher than  (and 
public goods higher than ) as the voter utility starts decreasing. The decrease of utility sends 
a signal of a poor state of the economy after any > < >, signalling a politician who cares more 
of his own rents then on voter welfare.  
In the final graph on the lower right, depicting the relationship between the ratio and 
the state of the economy, it is obvious that an increase of the ratio above 6 triggers a negative 
effect on the state of the economy.
11
 But the ambiguous part is the effect on the state of the 
economy for any level of the ratio 6 < 6. For any ratio 6 < 6 public good production 
decreases and other expenditures (transfers and wages) increase. This means the state of the 
economy wouldn’t decrease for those voters who depend on transfers and public sector 
                                                 
11
 This doesn’t imply that more public goods generate negative economic performance. It simply means that 
from the voters’ point of view more public goods (‘white elephants’) imply less spending on public sector wages 
and transfers, generating outcomes less favourable for voters who are directly dependent on government 
spending.  
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wages. No one would commence strikes and protests as they are receiving more money than 
before. However, this level decreases the voter utility for all those voters with stronger public 
good preferences and lowers the public good expenditures below the initial desired level by 
all voters ( < ). Also, for any level 6 < 6 the result wouldn’t be Pareto optimal as it 
would trigger a decrease in voter utility. This is why 6 would be the lowest voter 
indifference level in the re-election rule. Finally, it wouldn’t be profitable for the incumbent 
to do so as less public goods imply lower rents, or precisely for any 6 < 6, meaning that 
 <  implies rents to be  = 0.  This is stated in Proposition 2:  
Proposition 2: The incumbent party has no desire to choose any level of public goods lower 
than or equal to  (and no ratio lower than or equal to 6) as it has an intention to maximize 
rents through public good expenditures. The chosen level of public good expenditures will 
always be:  
              >   f[   6 > 6         (17) 
Proof: See Appendix A.  
Taking into account the findings from Propositions 1 and 2, the optimal level of public 
good provision and consequently the re-election ratio and rent-extraction can be found.  
Proposition 3: Assume the incumbent party observes  ≥ ∗. Since the party’s only way to 
maximize rents is through public good expenditures and since the re-election probability 
depends on staying within the desired set I ∈ J6 , 6K, it will always choose the public’s 
higher level of desired goods, 6, for the observed high level of . The equilibrium levels of 
public good expenditures and the ratio 6 are then: 
                              ∗ =   f[  6∗ = 6              (18) 
26 
 
Both the level of the ratio and public good production increase voter welfare at a 
decreasing rate: 
gh
g > 0, gihgi < 0, f[  ghgj > 0, gihgji < 0. The incumbent will converge 
towards the optimal equilibrium level of ∗ from which it can extract the optimal amount of 
rents; ∗ = k ∗ .   
Proof: See Appendix A. 
The incumbent sets an equilibrium level of public good production ∗ and hence the 
ratio 6∗ every period as this enables maximum rents from that period and maximizes the 
probability he is re-elected for the next period (since the ratio is within the indifference levels 
set by the voters, 6 ≤ 6 ≤ 6). According to the findings of Proposition 3 and the model 
description in Figure 2, the equilibrium state of the economy can be calculated.  
Proposition 4: If the equilibrium public good policy is ∗ = , and from this the equilibrium 
ratio is 6∗ = 6 according to Proposition 3, and under the assumption of the incumbent 
observing  ≥ ∗, the equilibrium level of the state of the economy is then always: 
     >∗ = >6∗∗        (19)  
where 
gl
gj
gj
g = glg < 0 verifying the assumption made by the model that voters who 
send negative signals depend on direct government expenditures. 
Proof: See Appendix A.   
For every equilibrium condition in which the incumbent chooses a high enough level 
of public good expenditures the state of the economy is good enough for the voters in order 
for the incumbent to get re-elected. This verifies the assumption that the level of public goods 
chosen indirectly influences the state of the economy by altering the ratio 6 upon which the 
voters create their beliefs. The economy will never produce at optimal full employment 
27 
 
efficiency, since there will always be an incentive for politicians to extract rents and 
misappropriate resources and thus lower the potential output.  
 Propositions 2 to 4 were all made under the assumption of the incumbent observing 
 ≥ ∗. Under high enough levels of  the incumbent chooses to continue to play the game in 
infinite periods. This is why any  ≥ ∗ moves the politician on the equilibrium path, where 
both the principles and the agent play a cooperative strategy making everyone better off. If, 
however,  < ∗ then the decision of the incumbent is to defect and maximize his current rent 
extraction. On Figure 2 this will be any level of public goods chosen that is  > , for which 
the state of the economy will be lower than >. Therefore, a decision made by an incumbent 
observing  < ∗ is an out of equilibrium path where he ends his game with the voters by 
choosing a defection strategy.  
According to these propositions I find a testable argument. Since an incumbent never 
chooses any  lower than , and since its upper re-election boundary is , upon observing a 
high  it decides to keep the ratio lower than or equal to 6, or higher than 6 upon observing a 
lower level of . The higher level of the ratio is the threshold level as according to 
Proposition 2 a politician will never set the ratio below 6, so any ratio lower than 6 will 
automatically respect the re-election rule. The empirical implication is that upon observing a 
negative (or diminishing) growth rate, the upper boundary of the re-election ratio will be 
disturbed and the ratio will be too high (since more public goods will be produced by the 
politician). This will lead to electoral defeat of the incumbent.  
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDECE 
 In order to test the main predictions of the model I present empirical evidence on the 
effects of ratio 6 on the probability of re-election. I test the following findings proposed in the 
paper: (i) an increase of 6 (and consequently an increase of public good expenditures,  
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decreases the probability of re-election after a certain point; and (ii) a decrease of real growth 
() one year before the elections will lead to an increase of the ratio 6.  
5.1. DATA AD EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
A panel data is collected for gubernatorial and state legislature elections (both upper 
and lower house) for 48 continental U.S. states over the period of 1992 to 2008. The database 
contains state elections for every two years
12
 and 9 elections for both governors and the state 
legislature. The reason for using data on United States is its availability and the same 
methodology of data collection and measurements for each state. The analysis becomes even 
more robust due to the fact that all 48 states are accountable to the same constitutional and 
legal boundaries and the same democratic order. In order to estimate the effects on electoral 
results the data is collected for state and local spending of each state observed, along with the 
variables of economic performance proven to have an effect on re-election of incumbents 
according to Brendner and Drazen (2008) and Besley and Case (2003). The summary 
statistics of all variables used in the model are presented in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B. 
The sources and explanations of the data on elections, spending and all other used variables 
are given in Appendix B under the summary tables.  
 The empirical strategy estimates the following linear probability model of the effect of 
changes in ratio 6 on the electoral success of the incumbent: 
   m8 = n + o)∆68 + o5∆685 + qrst + uvst + 8      (20) 
The dependent variable m8 for state R and time  is the dummy indicator that takes the 
value 1 if the incumbent governor is (re-)elected or if the party stays in majority in the state 
legislature and the value 0 if the incumbent governor loses the election or the party loses its 
                                                 
12
 Five U.S. states (AL, LA, MA, MI, NB) are only holding legislature elections for the lower house every 4 
years, while Nebraska has a unicameral and a non-partisan state legislature. All other states hold lower house 
legislature elections every two years.  
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majority. For a Republican governor in power if on the next legislature elections the 
Republicans lose the senate and/or assembly elections, the value given is 0. If the Republicans 
win this implies that they retain office, and the value assigned is 1. This assumption is based 
on the intuition that citizens punish bad behaviour of the in-office party when receiving 
signals of violating the ratio. Any policies made by the current governor that violate the ratio 
will result into punishment of the governor’s party in election time (every two years). This 
will signal to the governor that he needs to improve the ratio and cut down rent-extraction in 
order to remain in office or he will be punished as well as his party.    
 The explanatory variable is the change in the public spending ratio, ∆68. The change 
of the ratio is observed from the previous election year to the current election year in order to 
show if the incumbent is increasing or decreasing rent-extraction since the last voter signal 
observed. The values o) and o5 measure the effects of the ratio on incumbent re-election. The 
squared value ∆685  indicates the concavity of the voters’ preferences over the ratio as 
presented in Figure 2. The model offers a unique prediction that the ratio should increase up 
until a certain point, labelled 6 above which it wouldn’t be optimal for the incumbent to 
continue with rent-extraction.    
The control variables are in line with those used in some empirical political agency 
models
13
. These can be divided into a vector of economic (rst) and demographic (vst) 
differences between states that may affect the likelihood of incumbent re-election. The 
economic controls include measures of economic performance such as GDP growth in the 
election year and in one year before the elections, unemployment rate, income taxes, changes 
in personal income and deficit to GDP ratio. The demographic controls include total state 
population, share of population under 15 (young) and share of population over 65 (old), 
                                                 
13
 For example in Besley and Case (1995b, 2003), Listz and Sturm (2006), etc.     
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implying that states with too much old or young people will have higher levels of targeted 
social spending.  
When using gubernatorial and state elections panel data the paper uses state fixed 
effects (denoted by n) to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This way the focus of the 
estimates is shifted from across state differences to within state differences. The drivers of the 
potential bias are unobserved characteristics (such as individual and party preferences and 
politician ability) that tend to differ between states but are assumed to be constant over the 
short period of time observed. The ratio in each state is driven by different kinds of 
unobservable bias so by including state fixed effects the cut-off values of the ratio is allowed 
to differ across states.  
The problem arising when using a linear probability model is the inability to get good 
estimates for extreme values of the explanatory variable. In the dataset used, the explanatory 
variable (change in public spending ratio) doesn’t tend to take extreme values for any state 
observed. The extreme values reported in Table 1 are for the entire sample, but when 
observing each state individually the extreme values tend to be within a 10% range. The 
problem of heteroskedasticity that also tends to be a characteristic of linear probability models 
is controlled for by using robust standard errors, clustered by state.  
5.2. RESULTS 
Before the estimation of the ratio effects on re-election it is necessary to estimate 
whether there is a link between economic growth and ratio 6, which corresponds to the 
findings in Proposition 1 and is important for the conclusions in Propositions 3 and 4. If an 
incumbent party observes deteriorating growth one year before the elections it will base its 
rent-extraction in the election period on that observation. I estimate the following regression:  
       ∆68 = n + w8∆8 + qrst + uvst + x8      (21) 
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 where ∆68 denotes the ratio change as the dependent variable, while ∆8 is the main 
explanatory variable denoting change of economic growth of the state R one year before the 
election and the election year. The emphasis is on the change of the growth parameter since it 
explains the reaction of incumbents when observing deteriorating growth. This presents the 
growth shock of the current election period 8, upon which politicians anticipate future 
rents. If economic growth is worse in the election year than one year before the election, the 
incumbent anticipates lower rents in the next period and increases rent-extraction in this 
period thus driving up the ratio. The change of the ratio is observed in order to capture the 
reaction of the politicians on the growth change and anticipated rent-extraction. Parameter w8 
measures the total effect of economic growth on the ratio. Control variables are the same used 
in (20), while n is the state fixed effect.   
The paper tests the growth effect from two angles: the change of the growth rate from 
one year before the election to the election year, and the growth change as an indicator 
variable. The reason for the indicator variable is to show the growth effect directly, without 
taking into consideration its size, just its direction. The growth indicator variable (denoted 
‘growth change dummy’ in Table 3) is assigned to the growth change variable where a 
positive change (bigger growth in election year than the previous year) is given a value of 1, 
while a negative change (smaller growth in election year) is given a value of 0. This is 
consistent with propositions of the model, where both the growth rate in the current year and 
the growth rate in the previous year are variables that can explain the behaviour of the 
incumbent party.  
 The results are presented in Table 3 in Appendix B. Columns (1) to (3) test the 
relationship between the ratio change and the change of growth. The unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled for by including state fixed effects. The relationship between them 
is negative, as predicted by the model, but it only shows significance (at a 10% level) when 
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there are no controls included. By including controls, the explanatory variable loses its 
significance and by that its explanatory power. This could be explained by the size of the 
growth change which increases the standard error of the explanatory variable. In order to 
avoid the size effect of growth change, a set of OLS regressions (columns 4 – 6) are done 
testing the dummy growth change against the ratio change. These show a much better 
explanatory power and are significant at a 1% level for the first regression (4) and at a 5% 
level for the final two regressions. The last regression (6), including all control variables 
(economic and demographic) shows a negative effect of the change in economic growth to the 
change of the ratio; a decrease of economic growth since the previous year results in an 
increase of the ratio by 3.75% on average. Other variables that prove to have an effect on the 
ratio change are the unemployment rate, public expenditure growth, change in income tax and 
the term limit effect. An increase in unemployment and taxes result in a negative effect on the 
ratio which is expected. With more people unemployed and with lower incomes, the state has 
to divert more spending towards social services, driving up the denominator of the ratio and 
decreasing its value. The positive expenditure effect is also expected, meaning that more 
spending will drive up the ratio, by increasing public good expenditures. Finally, the term 
limit effect signals that as the end of the final term for the governor approaches, even though 
he has an increasing likelihood to extract more rents
14
, the party as a whole will try to 
decrease the ratio in order to remain in power. The conclusion differs for parties than it does 
for individual politicians, which is what the model implied in its assumptions of modelling an 
infinitely repeated game. Overall the results in Table 3 support the predictions of the model 
that economic growth in the previous year influences the party’s decision over spending and 
public good expenditures.   
                                                 
14
 As empirically proven by Alt, de Mesquita and Rose (2011), Besley and Case (1995b), Ferraz and Finan 
(2011) and Smart and Sturm (2006). 
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The results of the main prediction of the model – the effect of the ratio on re-election – 
are presented in Table 4 in Appendix B. Column (1) observes the direct effect of the ratio on 
re-election using state fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity, while columns 
(2) to (5) include the term limit effect and other economic and demographic variables. 
According to the results shown in columns (1) to (5) it can be inferred that over time the 
increasing levels of the ratio increase the probability of re-election
15
 for the incumbent and 
imply higher public good spending each period. As the population increases, the tax base is 
larger, revenues are higher and so are the expenditures. The finding goes in line with the 
prediction in Proposition 2, where the ratio chosen would always be the higher level ratio. 
However, the negative value of the square parameter, highly significant at a 1% level
16
, 
implies the concavity of voter preferences where too high levels of the ratio lead to a decrease 
of voter utility that can cause the incumbents to lose office. The inclusion of the term limit 
variable from column (2) onwards signals a significant negative relationship implying that if 
the party’s governor is reaching a term limit, the likelihood of the party remaining in office 
will decrease. This is why the party will try to improve its winning probability by decreasing 
the ratio when observing poor growth, as predicted by the term limit effect in Table 3.  
Columns (3) to (5) control for all other economic performance variables. In column (3) 
previous year growth shows a significant effect (5% level), but current period growth doesn’t. 
However, by controlling for other variables, lag growth loses significance in explaining re-
election. This goes in line with the findings of Brender and Drazen (2008) where they prove 
that economic growth in developed countries doesn’t have any effect on re-election. Besides 
growth, the share of population over 65 surprisingly has a negative effect on re-election on 
average. In the final column (6) the impact of the ratio is removed to show the effects of other 
economic performance variables on re-election. The final regression is a check of how good 
                                                 
15
 At a 5% significance level for all regressions.  
16
 For regressions (2), (4) and (5), while significant at a 5% level in regressions (1) and (3).  
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the data can explain re-election without the ratio or term limits. It seems that none of the 
control variables (apart from expenditure growth) have any significant effect on re-election as 
defined with parties instead of individual candidates. This further shows that the public 
spending ratio is an important determinant of party competition, decision making and rent-
extraction.  
Overall the empirical evidence presented tends to give support for the ideas proposed 
by the model. For decreasing economic growth the incumbents tend to increase the levels of 
the ratio. For increasing growth the ratio decreases, since the politicians allocate slightly more 
funds towards public sector wages and social transfers in order to remain in office to extract 
more expected next period rents. A higher level of the ratio tends to increase re-election 
probability but at a decreasing rate since a too high ratio implies that the incumbent is not 
allocating enough funds to satisfy the basic voter preferences. Contrary to the political 
business cycle theory, politicians won’t manipulate economic growth in order to get elected, 
they will try to manipulate budgetary expenditures and their rent-extraction based on the 
signals sent from the economic environment. The economic environment acts more as a signal 
to politicians on rent-extraction than to voters on re-election.  
6. COCLUSIO 
The main attempt of the paper is to develop a political agency model that observes 
how political parties can stay in office for long periods, without having to trade-off rent-
extraction for staying in power. Political rents are determined endogenously within the public 
good expenditure function where they increase for higher expenditures on public goods. The 
paper focused on explaining the moral hazard problem of incumbent politicians, where their 
rent-extraction is constrained by introducing a voter threshold denoted by the ratio of public 
goods to other expenditures. Altering the values of the ratio by choosing a level of public 
good expenditures will influence the state of the economy upon which the voters base their re-
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election decisions. The model stresses the importance of a repeated game setting and a 
stochastic economic growth shock that will determine the incumbent rent-extracting 
decisions. When observing a positive shock the incumbent will play a unique equilibrium 
cooperative strategy every time, since it expects more future rents, and will never be voted out 
of office. For a negative, or a diminishing, economic growth the incumbent will play a 
defection strategy where it extracts the maximum available amount of rents. For a cooperative 
strategy the state of the economy ends up within the voter’s threshold and they will reward the 
incumbent with re-election. For a defection strategy the state of the economy is disturbed and 
the voters apply an immediate punishment for the incumbent.  
The empirical evidence presented tends to support the claims stated in the paper using 
U.S.A. states data. It finds a negative causal relationship between previous year economic 
growth and the public spending ratio. Higher levels of the ratio increase the probability of re-
election up until a certain point when further public good production and higher ratios will 
yield the incumbent party out of office.  
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APPEDIX A 
Proof of Proposition 1: Define the cooperative strategy of the voters as fy, and the 
cooperative strategy of an incumbent R as z = z), … , z', for every z ∈ I. Any z outside 
the re-election set presents a defective strategy of the incumbent denoted as z2. The 
incumbent plays first and if it plays a cooperative strategy (z) the best response of the voters 
is to play cooperate as well fy in every stage. If the voters would deviate for a cooperative 
strategy of an incumbent (play f2y) they would send a signal to the incumbent to play a 
deviation strategy in the next period and extract maximum rents. Therefore, this strategy 
profile isn’t optimal for the voters. They will only use a deviating strategy upon observing a 
deviation from the incumbent. If an incumbent decides to deviate and play z2, his expected 
payoff will be EVP;	
 + EVP` 
. However, there will be no future payoffs for the 
incumbent, since his action will trigger a defection strategy from the voters. Even though in 
the first period it is obvious that any defection strategy will yield a higher immediate payoff, 
EVP;	
 > EVP;
 which is true since 	 >   and  >   ∀ , , the incumbent will 
not chose a defection strategy every period as it also values future rent opportunities. Ex ante 
rents are calculated based on the sum of all future utilities 8 & OP682)EVP8
'8() . By 
comparing payoffs from cooperative and defective strategies the incumbent will compare 
utilities of both actions adjusted for future expected utilities.   
A strategy profile z∗ for a repeated game is a Nash equilibriuim if the strategy z is the 
best response given what the voters will play when observing a defection strategy:   
z∗ ∈ argmax∈  z , z2∗  
For any incumbent R, it must be shown that z ≥ z2∗ . The incumbent plays a 
cooperative strategy if and only if the payoff from a cooperative strategy is higher than the 
payoff from a defection strategy, as stated in equation (14) from the model: 
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EVP;
 + 8 ] OP682)EVP8

'
8()
≥  EVP;	
 + EVP` 
 
where 682) concerns the level of the ratio in the previous period with respect to future 
utilities from  = 1 onwards. Solving the upper equation for 8 yields the optimal strategy for 
the incumbent:  
      8 ] OP682)EVP8
 
'
8()
≥ EVP;	
 + EVP` 
 − EVP;
 
Playing a cooperative strategy (z) is optimal if and only if:   
 
8 ≥ EVP;	
 + EVP` 
 − EVP;
& OP682)EVP8
 '8() = ∗ 
 
An incumbent cannot get a better payoff by deviating for any 8 ≥ ∗, meaning that 
the cooperative strategy solved for 8 is a Nash equilibrium of the tit-for-tat game for the 
incumbent. The game is a repeated stage game, repeated in every single period. A sub-game 
perfect equilibrium of a repeated game includes a stage game Nash equilibrium in every sub-
game. Since the stage game Nash equilibrium is played every period, or in every sub-game, it 
is by definition a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.∎  
Proof of Proposition 2 (By contradiction): Any level of public goods  <  implies two 
effects; a non-optimal amount of rents ( = 0) and no re-election (as the voter re-election rule 
I ∈ J6 , 6K isn’t satisfied). Any level of public goods  =  implies re-election since the 
voter re-election rule is under its boundaries but the level of rents is still  = 0. Incumbent 
party utility maximization function is according to equation (10) depended on rent-extraction 
(any  > ). Rent maximization disables the incumbent from choosing any  =  and 
therefore obtaining no rents. Since it isn’t plausible for the incumbent to choose any  ≤ , 
the chosen level of public goods always has to be  >  which is implied by proposition 2.∎ 
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Proof of Proposition 3: From the assumption implied by the model that the level of rents 
increases with public good expenditures in equations (3) and (4) it is obvious that the higher 
level of  chosen from the set 9 ∈ ;, …  … , '
, ∀R ∈  increases the utility the 
incumbent gets. The set 9 contains increasing levels of  for every level of expenditures 
chosen, meaning that ; < ) < 5 <  … < '. According to the definition of the ratio 6 
from equation (5) the level of public good chosen determines the level of the ratio, implying 
that the choice of 6 is also determined within a set containing increasing members;  ∈
6;, … , 6'
  where  6; < 6) < 65 <  … < 6', and where [ denotes the decision on the size 
of the ratio, 6; is the lowest level chosen implying no public goods and maximum transfers 
and wages, while 6' is the highest level chosen implying maximum public goods and no 
transfers or wages.   
The incumbent party when playing a cooperative strategy as implied in Proposition 3 
( ≥ ∗) chooses any level within the set I ∈ J6 , 6K, where I ⊆  (a subset of ). By 
assumption 6; < 6 and 6 < 6', meaning that the highest level of the ratio in set S is higher 
than 6 and that the lowest level of the ratio in S is lower than 6. If I ⊆  where both sets 
contain increasing members and if 6; < 6 and 6 < 6', then by choosing the highest 6 
within the re-election rule set I in order to maximize its utility, the incumbent will always 
chose the level 6∗ = 6.  The decision of optimal ∗ =  follows the same conclusion.∎ 
Proof of Proposition 4: From the proof of Proposition 3 and according to the assumptions of 
the model presented in Figure 2, it follows that for any  6∗ = 6 and ∗ =  and according to 
the assumption of a negative relationship between  and >, it must be that the state of the 
economy is >. The state of the economy >  is optimal >∗ = >6∗∗, for any  6∗ and ∗ 
chosen that satisfies Proposition 3. ∎ 
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APPEDIX B 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Re-election 432 0.6041667 0.4895959 0 1 
Ratio 432 0.1630327 0.0399779 0.0744813 0.3138859 
Change of ratio 384 0.0006781 0.1353455 -0.3617157 0.3969931 
Change^2  384 0.0182712 0.0253624 1.67E-08 0.1576035 
Term limit 432 0.2175926 0.4130872 0 1 
GDP 816 204000000 248000000 12500000 1910000000 
GDP growth 432 0.0566279 0.0292396 -0.0389991 0.1708972 
Lag GDP growth 432 0.0554604 0.0241432 -0.0536531 0.1399923 
Change in growth 389 0.0012966 0.0306592 -0.1160793 0.1104976 
Dummy growth change 389 0.4987147 0.5006423 0 1 
Budget deficit 720 2178828 6851939 -61400000 83500000 
Deficit to GDP 432 0.0101926 0.0199418 -0.0412 0.1928 
Change in deficit/GDP 384 -0.034349 9.585826 -95.607 115.729 
Revenue growth 389 0.0667248 0.1385824 -0.3817504 0.5898104 
Expenditures growth 384 0.0748308 0.0482547 -0.0206968 0.3016281 
Income tax rate 816 0.0941341 0.0117671 0.0602 0.1277 
Income tax change 384 -0.0026604 0.03121 -0.0934 0.0921 
Personal income 816 30609.88 8492.098 14749.27 63889.87 
Personal income change 384 0.0957109 0.0434129 -0.033 0.2809 
Unemployment rate 816 0.0497623 0.0132065 0.0227 0.1122 
Unemployment change 384 -0.0039784 0.2420115 -0.4384 1.027 
Population change 389 0.0133309 0.0139159 -0.007776 0.1044776 
Share of under 17 384 0.2519826 0.0196887 0.2077 0.3522 
Share over 65 384 0.131436 0.068148 0.085 1.42534 
Sources and description of data: Data on public good spending, budget revenues and expenditures decomposed 
into the data on capital outlays and current expenditures was taken from the US Census Bureau (2011) for the 
entire period observed.  
The public spending ratio was calculated by dividing capital outlay expenditures for each state (denoting public 
good expenditures) by all other current expenditures (which accounted total social transfers, public sector wages 
and all other expenditures). The capital outlay is defined as: “Direct expenditure for contract or force account 
construction of buildings, grounds, and other improvements, and purchase of equipment, land, and existing 
structures. Includes amounts for additions, replacements, and major alterations to fixed works and structures. 
However, expenditure for repairs to such works and structures is classified as current operation expenditure.” 
(US Census Bureau, 2011). Current expenditure “include direct expenditure for compensation of own officers 
and employees and for supplies, materials, and contractual services except amounts for capital outlay, assistance 
and subsidies, interest on debt, and insurance benefits and payments”. (US Census Bureau, 2011).  
Data on GDP and unemployment is taken from the US Bureau of Economic analysis (2011). Data on income 
taxes and personal income was taken from the Tax Foundation (2011). Data on population was taken from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States published by the Census Bureau (2011). 
The dummy variables on re-election were assigned as specified under equation (20), and according to the data 
from Table 2.  
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Table 2: Election summary data 
 Legislature elections 
Elections/ 
Parties 
Governor 
State Senate 
(Upper) 
State House 
(Lower) 
Total Democrats  96 218 242 
Total Republicans 115 205 181 
Total Independent  3 - - 
Total elections 214 423 423 
All 48 states included, over the period from 1992 until 2008. Total Democrats and total Republicans includes 
every time when a Democrat or Republican governor or party would either win office or hold office. 
Source and description of data: Election data on both gubernatorial and state legislature election (upper and 
lower house) was taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States from the years 1992 - 2008 published 
by the Census Bureau (2011).  
Notes on electoral results: Nebraska state legislature is unicameral and non-partisan, so only gubernatorial 
changes are observed in this state. In California in 2003 gubernatorial recall elections are accounted as the 2002 
elections where the democrat in power at the time, Gary Davis, instead of ensuring his second term was recalled 
a year later. On the new elections the Republican candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger won. The dummy value 
given for 2002 is 0, since it is accounted as an incumbent defeat. Gubernatorial and state legislature elections are 
all being held in even years except for Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and Virginia which are 
held in odd years. The previous period growth effects are all taken into account for these 5 states.  
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